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Abstract
If individuals derive a small utility from gambling, we should observe high turnover
in portfolios that are of only marginal importance to them. By the use of detailed
individual financial data, as well as trades from a Swedish online broker, I measure
the frequency and cost of online trading in the cross-section, and find the opposite
relation. Those who have online portfolios that constitute a large share of risky assets
trade more aggressively, but have lower trading performance. These results can be
explained by a simple Treynor-Black portfolio model where investors suffer from bi-
ased self-assessment, rather than possessing true investment skill. The overall result
suggests that the cost of online trading can be substantial. The top quintile of in-
vestors who have the highest share of their total financial assets in stocks invested at
the brokerage firm under study loose 3.70% of their financial wealth annually, which
corresponds to 1.38% of aggregate income within this group. These investors do not
only have lower overall wealth and income, but also have the highest aggregate trad-
ing losses. Therefore, trading losses are mainly carried by those who can afford them
the least. Across individuals, annual losses for 36% of investors exceed 1% of their
financial wealth, and 17% lose more than 5%.
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1 Introduction
It is an established fact in the theory of decision making that individuals behave differ-
ently to small versus large sized gambles. Markowitz (1952b) notes that most individuals
are risk seeking or neutral for small-stake gambles, say choosing a 10% chance of winning
$10 over a $1 for certain. However, as stakes are increased, most people find it less attrac-
tive to gamble, and very few would choose a risky 10% chance of winning $1,000,000,
faced with a certain $100,000. Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) dub this phenomena the
“peanuts effect”. The results from small-sized bets are difficult to interpret, as people
may be simply indifferent to small stakes, or “peanuts”. Conlisk (1993) suggests that in-
dividuals derive some positive utility from gambling itself that, locally, can dominate risk
aversion. One would then expect people to always gamble with peanuts, but then it is un-
clear what the welfare implications are and how important the problem is for economic
analysis. Shiller (1998) points out that the enjoyment of gambling is more complicated
than can be captured by standard utility functions. Gambling is usually confined to spe-
cific areas, or favorite games, where individuals feel that they are especially skillful or
lucky.
Investing in financial markets is very different from gambling – at least in theory. Stan-
dard, normative advise is to avoid high trading costs and hold diversified portfolios. In
direct contradiction stand the two most important stylized facts in the literature of in-
vestor behavior: investors trade too much, as evidenced by Barber and Odean (2000)),
and they hold poorly diversified portfolios, as documented by Goetzmann and Kumar
(2005) and Polkonichenko (2004)). Kumar (2005) finds that investors with similar socioe-
conomic background as those preferring lottery-tickets also prefer stocks with positively
skewed payoffs (e.g. poor, less educatedmen, living in urban areas). Given the low diver-
sification and high trading frequency, it is only natural to ask if poor trading performance
really is economically important to investors, or if it is to be regarded as some form of
entertainment.
This paper aims to document to which extent trading is related to significant amounts
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for individuals. The peanuts effect can be explained by individuals deriving some small,
constant utility from gambling that dominates risk-aversion. This implies that it is mainly
those who have proportionally small amounts of their wealth invested in their online
portfolios who trade. As an alternative hypothesis, I present a portfolio choice problem
with overconfidence that gives the opposite prediction. Investors who believe that they
are better traders, allocate a higher share of financial assets to their traded portfolio. This
is amuch sharper test of overconfidence than found inmost other studies, because it gives
a strong cross-sectional prediction. People who trade more will do so with higher stakes,
even if they are no better traders than other investors. The two features taken together
directly implies that utility losses from trading can be substantial.
Unlike other performance studies, this paper makes explicit use of trading data from
an online broker, as well as detailed individual financial tax reports in order to answer
these questions. The active weight proxies for the investors belief in their trading capabil-
ity, and is defined as each individuals stock portfolio value at the broker account divided
by the value of all risky assets (financial wealth excluding holdings of cash and money
market funds), measured at first year-end of trading . The cumulative distribution of the
active portfolio for the 10,600 investors in sample is displayed in Figure 1, normalized
either by risky assets or total financial assets. As expected, online portfolios constitute a
relatively small part of financial wealth for many people. Around 25% of the individuals
have stocks worth 5% or less of their total financial assets; around 50% of the investors
20% or less. For 50% of the individuals, the online portfolio weight of risky assets is less
than 34%, which means that these investors hold more than 76% of their risky assets in
other financial instruments than stocks at the online broker. At the top of the distribution,
17% of the investors have 75% or more of their financial wealth invested into stocks at the
online account, and this constitute all of their holdings in risky assets. These results show
that there is a wide dispersion of how much trading can effect investors utility, even if
returns from trading were constant.
If losses from trading are mainly associated with “unimportant” portfolios at the left
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side of Figure 1, the documented results on trading performance can be seriouslymislead-
ing. To the contrary, it is found that investors with a larger share of their wealth at stake
(at the right side of Figure 1) are both more likely to trade, and have a higher turnover
when they do trade. There is also a negative relationship between investors’ online port-
folio weight and trading performance. In regressions that control for turnover, as well
as portfolio size, wealth, diversification, financial occupation, risk, age, and gender it is
found that the main channel for this underperformance is through increase trading, and
not lower average trading ability. The results adds evidence to the previous literature on
investor behavior and overconfidence, since it is shown not only that investors who trade
more, lose more on average, but are also more willing to place larger sized bets. Such
behavior is predicted by a model with biased self-assessment, in which investors who
believe themselves to be ”better-on-average” increase their allocation to an undiversified
portfolio. The peanuts hypothesis can therefore forcefully be rejected.
In conclusion, it is found that the top quintile of investors who have the highest active
weight loose 3.70% of financial wealth annually, which corresponds to 1.38% of aggregate
income within this group. These investors do not only have lower overall wealth and
income, but also have the highest aggregate trading losses. Therefore, losses are mainly
carried by those who can afford them the least. The latter result have been inferred before
from self-reported data by Barber and Odean (2001) and Kumar (2005), and is stressed by
Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) and Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2006): Private investors may
constitute a small part of the stock market, but investment mistakes can potentially have
a large impact on individual utility. In the cross-section of individuals, 36% of investors
loose more than 1% of their financial wealth due to trading, and 17% of the investors loose
more than 5%, measured in annualized terms compared to the own-benchmark. It follows
from the concentration of low weighs to the online portfolio in Figure 1 that a large part
– 49% of investors – have trading revenues that constitute between plus and minus 1%
of financial wealth. Even if almost two-thirds of the investors lose from trading, there
are also those who earn sizable amounts. About 8% of the investors gain more than 5%
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compared to their benchmark portfolio, measured as a fraction of their financial wealth
on an annual basis.
The paper is organized into six sections. Section two explains how trading and port-
folio selection is related in a stylized version of the Treynor-Black model. Section three
presents the data, section four derives amethod ofmeasuring trading revenue and return.
Section five presents the results, and section six concludes.
2 A simple portfolio model with overconfidence
Empirical work by Barber and Odean (2000) suggest that individual investors trade far
more than can be justified by rational agents within a standard expected utility frame-
work. Active investors earn lower returns due to fees and bid-ask spreads, but also due
to unprofitable trading strategies, as found by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000). Such irra-
tional trading can be explained by overconfidence. Inmarket settings, it is usually enough
to model overconfident investors by assuming miscalibration in order to generate trad-
ing. More precisely, some investors understate the riskiness of assets as in, e.g., Kyle and
Wang (1997), Odean (1998), andHong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2005).1 The psychological
literature gives a broader meaning to overconfidence. In the survey of Dunning, Heath,
and Suls (2004), they summarize it as follows:
...on average, people say that they are above average in skill (a conclusion that
defies statistical possibility), overestimate the likelihood that they will engage
in desirable behaviors and achieve favorable outcomes, furnish overly opti-
mistic estimates of when they will complete future projects, and reach judge-
ments with too much confidence.
Therefore, flawed self-assessment is not only the propensity to understate risks, but to
hold an overly optimistic view of ones true capabilities. There is some evidence that this
distinction of overconfidence is important to explain trading behavior. Using data from
1Trading can also occur without private information inmodels of differences in opinion as in, e.g., Harris
and Raviv (1993) and Varian (1989). Even if the models in this category generally are silent about the reason
for disagreement, all of them share the feature that greater disagreement leads to increased trading.
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several UBS/Gallup Investor surveys, Graham, Harvey, and Huang (2005) find that in-
vestors who respond that they regard themselves to be competent in the area of investing
both trade more frequently and diversify more widely. Glaser andWeber (2004) surveyed
online investors and found a robust relation between their measure of the ”better-than-
average” effect and trading activity, but no relation between a traditional measure of mis-
calibration and trading. In order to formalize the alternative hypothesis to the peanuts
effect, and to better understand the different concepts of overconfidence, consider a port-
folio problemwith a mean-variance investor. With standard quadratic utility, the investor
maximize utility by allocating the weight
wP ∗ =
E (R∗P )−RF
γV ar(R∗P )
, (1)
to the risky asset P . Ex ante, the investor believe he or she has an ability to outperform
the market by α̂, on average. Let there be some uncertainty about this ability denoted
T , and it is independent of the disturbance term M . Note that these expectations can be
perfectly rational if the investor really is better on average.2 We also allow investors to
be miscalibrated such that they underweight the true risk of the market, as well as the
uncertainty of α̂ by a common factor 0 < c ≤ 1. Assuming normality, we have
RM = µM + cM, cM ∼ N(0, c2σ2M)
RT = RM + α̂+ cT, cT ∼ N(0, c2σ2T )
The optimal investment in the trading asset, wT ∗ , is given by maximizing the Sharpe-
ratio of a portfolio of RM and RT . The solution is
wT ∗ =
α̂/σ2T
(µM −RF ) /σ2M
, (2)
which is the standard solution to the model of Treynor and Black (1973), as the weight to
the traded portfolio is increasing in the appraisal ratio in the numerator. The confidence
2But since investing in the stock market is a zero sum game, this belief also implies that some other
investors are below average.
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parameter drops out since it scales the numerator and denominator by the same amount.3
Substituting (2) into (1), factorizing, and simplifying the expression gives
wP ∗ =
(
α̂/σ2T
(µM−RF )/σ2M
)
α̂+ µM −RF
γ
[(
α̂/σ2T
(µM−RF )/σ2M
)2
c2σ2T + c
2σ2M
] = (3)
=
(µM −RF )−1 σ−2T (α̂σ2M − 2µMRFσ2T + µ2Mσ2T +R2Fσ2T )
γ
[
(µM −RF )−2 σ−2T (α̂σ2M − 2µMRFσ2T + µ2Mσ2T +R2Fσ2T )c2σ2M
] =
=
µM −RF
γc2σ2M
.
Therefore, in the absence of miscalibration, the weight to the risky asset is only a function
of risk aversion and the market return. Most notably, it is independent of α̂ and σ2T .
The intuition for this result is that, due to independence, the allocation to trading scales
linearly in mean and variance. The investor allocates more to trading for a higher α̂, but
keeps the allocation to risky assets at the whole constant. This independence cannot be
generalized to arbitrary chosen utility functions, and is not the result to be stressed here.
The point is that the choice of an active portfolio directly links to trading, but does not
necessarily mean that investors have bigger appetite for risk.
This becomes clear in the case of miscalibration, when c < 1. It is then impossible
to discriminate between risk aversion and miscalibration because the parameters are not
identified. A miscalibrated investor will have a higher weight to the risky portfolio P
at any level of risk aversion. Note, however, that the weight to the trading portfolio T
is independent of miscalibration. The implication of this stylized model is therefore that
turnover is predicted by the weight in the traded portfolio among the set of tradable risky
assets, but unrelated to the level of risk aversion and miscalibration. Since the weight to
trading is given by the investors’ perceived appraisal ratio, it will be correlated with their
true stock-picking ability, but also reflect how optimistic they are about their capabili-
ties. In this static model, investors can believe ex-ante that they have such ability, while
ex-post, they do not. Such behavior may seem difficult to maintain with updating and
3The fact that the coefficients for miscalibration are the same turns out to be unimportant for the general
result below.
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realigning expectations. Although not modelled explicitly here, ”cognitive dissonance”
make people credit themselves for past success and blame external factors for failure
(Langer and Roth (1975)). This feature of human behavior could, at least in principle,
explain why adjustment is slow.4
3 Data
The data were made available by an online broker and cover all transactions since the
start in May 1999 up to and including March 2002. The data covers 324,736 transactions
in common stocks that are distributed over 16,831 investors who enter sequentially over
time.5 From this sample, investors are selected that have been active for at least 12 months
and from whom there is complete data on wealth and income. The remaining sample is
10,600 investors who made 224,964 common stock transactions distributed over 241,118
investor portfolio months.6 The average investor is therefore active approximately 24
months.
In addition to trading data, the sample has been matched to Statistics Sweden database
with detailed background information of the investors. These data include exact infor-
mation on investors market value of total portfolio at each year-end. More importantly,
all Swedish financial institutions are by law required to report the market value of all
individual’s financial instruments as well as bank holdings directly to the Swedish Tax
Authority. This means that each investor’s total portfolio is observable at yearly inter-
vals, and can be matched to those stocks that is held at the particular online broker under
study. Furthermore, there is information of housing wealth (taxable), total liabilities, cap-
ital insurance, and income. It is also possible to retrieve information if income originates
from employment in the financial sector - something that may be indicative of better train-
ing in financial decision making. Combined, this allows for a quite detailed analysis of
how different investor and portfolio characteristics affect portfolio performance, and in
4For an example, see Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), who use cognitive dissonance in a
dynamic framework to explain slow and asymmetric price adjustment to news.
5See Anderson (2004) for a more comprehensive summary of this data.
6Total transactions include 120,734 purchases, 82,846 sales, and 21,384 deposits and redemptions of
stocks.
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particular–detailed controls–when studying turnover performance in the cross-section.
Some features of the data and matching is worth describing in more detail. Income is
measured as the first observed year-end disposable income adjusted for net capital gains.
Turnover is calculated as the total value of all trades each month divided by two times the
portfolio value at the beginning of the month. Finance is an indicator variable if the main
source of working income has been earned in the financial sector during the year. Wealth
is broken up into three major components: Financial, Real Estate, and Debt. Financial
wealth is in turn broken up into bank holdings, money market funds, bonds, stocks, eq-
uity and mixed mutual funds, other financial instruments, capital insurance, and other
financial wealth. All financial wealth is measured at market values, except for the last
component that includes non-listed instruments, private equity, promissory notes, and
self-reported values of chattels.7 The market value for Real Estate is not observable, but is
measured as an adjusted value liable for taxation. In general, the tax value should reflect
75% of the market value, but is sometimes understated in regions of high price increases
(i.e. urban areas, or popular areas of recreation). The reported values are conservatively
adjusted by multiplying all real estate by the factor 1.33.
Three wealth measures are used. Financial wealth, already defined, Risky assets, and
Total wealth. Risky assets includes all financial wealth, except bank holdings and money
market funds. This measure of riskywealth is quite wide, but have the advantage that it is
clearly defined. Total wealth is Real and Financial assets net of liabilities, but it is assumed
that individuals can only borrow on real assets. If market values are indeed understated
in spite of the correction, liabilities are assumed to be associated with real estate only,
and calculated as the maximum of real estate minus liabilities, and zero.8 At the heart
of the analysis is the investors active weight. The proxy used here is investors’ observed
online portfolio value at first year-end, divided by risky assets. Even though real assets
also can be regarded as being risky, it is assumed that the part of wealth that is investable
7Swedish tax law requires individuals to state the value of private property, such as cars, boats, and
jewellery. It is, however, doubtful how close these are to market values since it is virtually impossible to
enforce.
8This maximum rule was imposed on 3% of investors in sample.
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consists only of financial wealth, which is in accordance with the model in section 2.
In order to make sure that it is not only individuals that have overall low exposure to
the stock and bond market who engage in trading, a separate risk measure is used for
control. Trading can also be dependent of risk aversion in a dynamic context, where
a given shock to the economy can generate different levels of portfolio rebalancing. A
crude measure of risk is calculated as the total holdings of risky financial wealth divided
by total wealth. This variable therefore captures themore general propensity for investors
to hold risky assets, and the rank correlation with the active weight is but 9%. There are
several reasons for this low correlation. Around 46% of the investors in sample had stocks
at other accounts at the year of matching, but equally important, around 64% also held an
equity mutual fund. In addition, almost 65% of the investors also own real estate, which
is an important part of total wealth. In sample, financial wealth constitutes but 34% of
total wealth including liabilities, which is typical for Swedish citizens.
The measure of active weight brakes the link between the overall preference for risk,
and self-assessed trading ability. It is not necessary that a low active weight implies a
preference for lower stock market risk, because risky assets may constitute a large por-
tion of overall wealth. Further, an active weight equal to one means that the individual
have all her risky financial wealth invested into the broker account, but this may repre-
sent a small part of total wealth if the value of safe assets or real estate is substantial.
Investors may trade stocks at other accounts, but the model in section 2 predicts that the
allocation and trading decision go hand in hand, such that we should expect a higher con-
centration of financial wealth allocated to undiversified stock portfolios where turnover
is high. It is impossible to discard that individuals with small amounts allocated to their
online portfolio also trade extensively in some other assets, or at some other brokerage
account where they may choose to concentrate their financial assets. This would, how-
ever, only reinforce the main results of this paper, as long as their trading performance is
uncorrelated over the accounts they are trading.
Table 1 display the data sorted into quintiles and highest decile with respect to turnover.
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Turnover is skewed, where around 15% of investors never trade and the top ten percent
of investors turnover around 55% of their portfolio per month (about 6.6 times per year).
The average yearly turnover is 113%, which means that the investor buy and sell their
portfolio roughly once a year. There is a strong correlation between turnover and active
weight. Those in the lowest quintile of turnover, who basically never trade, have about
half the active weight as those in the top turnover quintile. This generally rejects the
peanuts story as a motivation for trading. Portfolio size is, however, also positively cor-
related with turnover, which is indicative of that the absolute value of investment also
may be a powerful determinant of turnover and that these variables may be interrelated.
Diversification is low, where the average investor holds around 3 stocks, and the median
investor only 2. Table 1 show that the investors in the lowest quintile of turnover have
smaller portfolios and are less diversified. A possible explanation is that these investors
refrain from trading due to high trading costs. Income andwealth is highly positively cor-
related. Investors in the top turnover quintile have somewhat lower income and wealth,
but the difference is only statistically significant for income. The difference in risk be-
tween low and high turnover investors is significant, where those who trade the most
have a larger proportion of their overall wealth invested into stocks. There is a clear and
monotonic negative relationship between the amount of females and turnover quintiles.
This broadly confirms the results of Barber and Odean (2001), who argue that women
are less overconfident compared to men, and therefore also trade less. It is not clear that
younger investors trade more than older. The average age in the top decile is about the
same as the bottom quintile. The same pattern is observed for those with financial occu-
pation. The representation of this group is more pronounced in the group that trade the
least, but also the group that trade the most.
It is worth commenting how the data on wealth, income, and portfolio values relate
to Swedish nationals in general. The average portfolio size is skewed with an average
at SEK 87,000, the minimum SEK 1,000 and maximum exceeding SEK 19 million. The
median stock portfolio in sample is therefore much lower at SEK 18,091. This is, how-
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ever, approximately what is found for Swedes in general. Statistics Sweden report that
the median for the whole country is SEK 20,000 and SEK 15,000 at the end of 1999 and
2001. Similarly, diversification is also low for most Swedes. The median Swede only hold
one stock. It is difficult to relate income and wealth, as such data is not available for
stock holders only. In general, investors in sample have both higher income and wealth
compared to Swedes, but is probably a consequence of that stock market participants are
wealthier on average. This could also be a reason why women are less represented, since
they on average earn lower income.9
4 Turnover performance
It is difficult to find a proper benchmark when investors hold undiversified portfolios.
The now standard extensions of Markowitz’s (1952a) single-index model proposed by
Fama and French (1992) and Carhart (1997) may fail to capture specific preferences of, for
example, skewness that may be desirable to individual investors.
In the spirit of Grinblatt and Titman (1993), we let the investors instead self-select a
benchmark portfolio at the beginning of each month, which is taken as given to reflect
the desirable return profile. Ruling out liquidity motives, rational investors with correct
expectations of future returns should on average only trade if deviations from the self-
selected benchmark is profitable. Even in the presence of ”mechanical” motives to trade,
such as liquidity and risk management, these costs are expected to be small. If investors
trade for liquidity reasons, most investors can either sell or buy a mutual fund (as there
are very few funds that have loading and exit fees in Sweden) or lend, alternatively bor-
row cash. If the investor is constrained, such that this is not applicable, it would still not
be rational to trade too frequently at high costs, compared to trading once and store some
cash at a bank account. In any of these cases, it is difficult to see why rational investors
trade excessively at high costs. In addition, the ”constraint motivation” for trading does
not square easily with the positive correlation between turnover and portfolio size found
9The median Swedish woman also had somewhat lower portfolio value compared to men; SEK 13,000
at the end of 1999.
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in data.
The approach defining monthly payoffs and returns is as follows. Since the cash ac-
count is unobservable on a monthly basis, it is assumed that investors hold unlevereged
portfolios and the capital base usedwhen calculating returns is only increased if the trans-
actions involve a net increase in funding. Therefore, it is important to take the exact tim-
ing of trades into account. A sale that precedes a purchase need not affect the capital base,
but the reverse transaction will. Furthermore, the interest for any cash balance that is ei-
ther needed for financing or for storing cash must be properly accounted for.10 A detailed
description of how the trading payoff and return is calculated is given below.
4.1 Calculating trading returns
Let xn,i,t be the number of shares of a stock n held by the individual i at the end of month
t. A transaction d during month t is denoted by xn,i,d, and super-indices B and S indicate
whether it is a buy or a sell transaction. Similarly, associated actual purchasing and sales
prices including fees are denoted pBn,i,d and p
S
n,i,d for each of these transactions. In what
follows, we also need the closing price for stock n on the last day of month t, which is
labelled pCn,t. The stock position for individual i at the end of month t is
xn,i,t = xn,i,t−1 +
∑
d∈t
(
xBn,i,d − xSn,i,d
)
, (4)
which is the position at the beginning of month t plus the sum of buys and sells during
the month, hereafter net purchases for short. In what follows, we will impose the restric-
tion that xn,i,t ≥ 0, meaning that investors are not allowed to have outstanding negative
positions at month-end.
10The approach here is related to that of Linnainmaa (2005) who investigates daytrades, but he only
analyzes individual daily stock returns which is different as it avoids the issues involved considering whole
portfolios.
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4.1.1 Payoffs
Trading, position and total payoffs for each stock and individual are as follows. The
position payoff is defined as
ΠPn,i,t = xn,i,t−1 · (pCn,t − pCn,t−1), (5)
which is simply the position at the beginning of the month times the change in price. The
trading payoff in stock n for individual i during month t is given by
ΠTn,i,t =
∑
d∈t
pSn,i,d · xSn,i,d −
∑
d∈t
pBn,i,d · xBn,i,d +
∑
d∈t
(
xBn,i,d − xSn,i,d
)
pCn,t. (6)
The first and second component of (6) states the net sales revenue of stock n during
month t, which is the value of sells minus buys at actual transacted prices. This value
needs to be adjusted if the number of stocks sold exceeds sales, or vice versa. The third
component of (6) adjusts payoffs by the value of net purchases that are already accounted
for by (5). Deposits of stocks are assumed to be transacted at the beginning of the month
and redemptions at the end. Therefore, xn,i,t−1 also includes all deposits of stocks made
during the month. Investors are allowed to short-sell their stock with these definitions
because the summation is invariant to the ordering of purchases and sales. The restriction
only means that there must be a positive holding of each stock at the end of the month.11
Total payoff for each investor i in stock n is the sum of trading and position payoff
Πn,i,t = Π
T
n,i,t +Π
P
n,i,t. (7)
To find the payoff for the whole portfolio, we sum over n to obtain total portfolio
payoff for individual i in month t
Πi,t =
∑
n
Πn,i,t =
∑
n
ΠTn,i,t +
∑
n
ΠPn,i,t. (8)
11In the sample, this proved to be a minor problem as there were only 34 instances where it was needed
to cover open short positions at month’s end. This was done by dating the corresponding buy transaction
at the beginning of the following month, t+ 1, as belonging to t.
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4.1.2 Capital components
Similar to payoffs, we distinguish between position and trading capital as follows. Posi-
tion capital is defined as
CPi,t =
∑
n
(
xn,i,t−1 · pCn,t−1
)
, (9)
which is simply the value of all stocks in the portfolio at the beginning of the month.
The amount of capital engaged in trading is determined by sorting each transaction in
calendar time. The traded value of any sale or purchase at any day is
TVi,d =
 pi,d · x
J
i,d if J = S
−pi,d · xJi,d if J = B
 ,
such that it represents the revenue of any sales and cost of any purchase. The trade val-
ues are ordered during the month from beginning to end for each investor regardless of
which stock is traded, and the cash balance is calculated at each point in time. The low-
est cumulative cash balance in month t is the minimum amount needed to finance the
portfolio without leverage, and is written
CTi,t = −min
d
[∑
d∈t
TVi,d, 0
]
, (10)
and is expressed as a positive number since we pick out the largest negative cash balance.
Total capital is the sum of position capital and trading capital,
Ci,t = C
P
i,t + C
T
i,t. (11)
Therefore, the capital base is only increased if trading incurs additional funding. But
this is exactly what wewant, because the investor who reallocates her investment without
using additional funds will have the same capital base.
4.1.3 Excess returns
Excess returns are created as follows. It is assumed that the investor can borrow and
deposit cash at the available 30-day T-bill rate, rFt−1, in order to finance the portfolio. The
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interest that is attributable to the position component, IPi,t, is calculated as the cost of
borrowing the value of the portfolio at the beginning of the month, i.e the first part of
equation (11).
If trading occurs, we seek the net interest paid for trading capital during themonth. In-
terest is calculated for each transaction and summed over the month creating the revenue
ITi,t that corresponds to the interest that is attributable to the actual timing of purchases
and sales.12
The excess return is therefore
Ri,t =
Πi,t + I
P
i,t + I
T
i,t
Ci,t −min
[
ITi,t, 0
] , (12)
where IPi,t is always 0 or negative and ITi,t is negative if there is a net cost of financing
the monthly transactions. When trading capital is 0 but the investor is net selling, ITi,t
represents the interest earned on investments that is sold out of the portfolio. In this way,
timing of the sale is properly accounted for since positive interest is added to the return
measure. Both trading capital and ITi,t can be positive if the investor only draws cash for
a short time and for a small amount in comparison to sales revenues in a month.
The interest on trading capital is only added to the capital base if it is negative. This
is because it is assumed that interest earned is paid out at the end of the month, but
any costs must be covered by capital at the beginning of the month. It therefore ensures
that returns are bounded at -1. In the case of no trading, ITi,t = 0, we obtain the familiar
definition of excess returns, which is
Ri,t =
Πi,t + I
P
i,t
CPi,t
= ri,t − rFt−1.
4.1.4 Passive returns
The idea of comparing investor performance with their own-benchmark was originally
proposed by Grinblatt and Titman (1993). Here, the passive return captures the same
12Two assumptions apply: the borrowing and lending rates are the same and the effect of compounding
during the month is ignored.
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intuition and is defined as
RPi,t =
ΠPi,t − IPi,t
Ci,t
, (13)
which is the position payoff divided by total capital corrected for interest. As the own-
benchmark return measures the return of the portfolio since there was no trading during
the month, we see that (12) and (13) are exactly the same, because then we have that
Πi,t = Π
P
i,t.
The passive return measure uses total capital as a base. It is therefore assumed that
whatever funds used for net investments during the month are invested at the risk-free
rate. The investors can only deviate from the benchmark by trading. During the month,
investors can move in and out of the market as a whole or switch allocation between
stocks. If these tactical changes in risk and reallocations are profitable, investors earn a
higher excess return on the traded portfolio than on the static own-benchmark. Trading
return is therefore defined
RTi,t = Ri,t −RPi,t, (14)
and a the cost of trading per unit of turnover. Turnover cost is
TOCi =
∑
t(Π
T
i,t − ITi,t)∑
t
∑
d TVi,d,t
, (15)
and measures trading profit per unit of turnover value.
5 Results
Table 2 summarizesmany of the key results of this paper, where themeans for the turnover
costs and trading returns are partitioned into quintiles of the active weight. Investors
with the highest proportion of risky assets invested at the online broker trade more, have
larger portfolios, but also lower trading returns. This pattern is clearest for the difference
between the fifth and first quintile, which is highly statistically significant. Compared
to investors in the bottom quintile of active weight, the top quintile investors loose 18
basis points per month on average. The turnover cost is somewhat U-shaped, but the
16
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difference between the top and bottom quintile of investors is around 0.74%. This means
that the flow of money that is traded cost less for investors in the top quintile, but does
not compensate enough for their higher turnover. The turnover cost is proportional to the
portfolio size, since lower portfolio size is associated with smaller transactions and higher
percentage fees.13 Investors with the highest active weight have considerably larger port-
folios, but size does not explain the average performance after fees which is 8 basis points
lower compared to the same group. Since the returns are measured to an own-benchmark
defined at the beginning of month, the residual is completely due to stock selection and
market timing.
The remainder of the analysis of trading performance is conducted in three steps.
First, the propensity to trade conditional on the observed characteristics is estimated on
the full sample in order to determine the profile of those who trade. This includes tak-
ing the marginal probability of those who do not trade into account when calculating the
overall effect of investor characteristics on turnover. The second step estimates the rela-
tionship between the same characteristics and trading returns, conditional on turnover
being positive. The analysis of trading performance is therefore confined to those who
actually trade, but concerns the cross-sectional differences in performance of these in-
vestors. Finally, the ex-post distribution of trading losses is analyzed.
5.1 Who is trading?
The first step is to determine who is trading, based on the characteristics data. The expec-
tation of average monthly turnover for each individual, TOi, conditional data Xi can be
written
E(TOi|Xi) = P (I = 0|Xi) · 0) + P (I = 1|Xi) · E(TOi|Xi, I = 1) (16)
= P (I = 1|Xi) · E(TOi|Xi, I = 1),
where the indicator variable I takes the value one if turnover is observed. Following
a version of the corner solution model considered in Wooldridge (2002), assume that if
13Anderson (2004) investigate this relationship in more detail.
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turnover is observed, it obeys
E(TOi|Xi, I = 1) = Xiβ. (17)
where the error term of the regression is normally distributed. Then the probability that
turnover is observed follows a Probit model
P (I = 1|Xi) = Φ(Xiλ). (18)
The models (17) and (18) can be consistently be estimated separately from data. It
follows that the marginal effects are
dE(TOi|Xi)
dXi
= βΦ(Xiλ) +Xiβφ(Xiλ)λ, (19)
where the first part can be thought of as an “turnover” effect, and the second part a
“participation” effect, since a given change in Xi will affect both the probability to trade
as well as the magnitude of turnover. Table 3 display the estimation results as well as the
marginal effects of the model.
The active weight, portfolio size, and diversification increase the probability to trade.
Evaluated at the functionalmean, themarginal effects on turnover are about equal around
4%. The positive relation between portfolio size and the decision to trade is not surpris-
ing. It is likely that some investors are unwilling to trade in very small portfolios, since
trading costs in percentage terms can be high in presence of minimum cost of fees.14 The
probability to trade is significantly decreasing in the level of wealth, risk, female, and
age, where overall risk is most important. Investors with high wealth and high stock
market risk exposure are less likely to trade, which supports the notion of them being
more experienced and better trained in financial decisions.
The OLS estimation generally follows the same pattern, except for diversification and
age. Less diversified, as well as younger investors, are less likely to trade, but those who
do trade, trade significantly more. There is a strong and positive effect of portfolio size
and the active weight. Investors who have a larger share of their financial wealth invested
14The minimum cost per trade was SEK 89, or roughly USD 10, during the sample period.
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at the online account have both a higher probability to trade, as well as higher turnover
when they do trade.
The last column of Table 3 shows the effect on turnover of a positive one standard
deviation shock to the dependent variable, evaluated at the turnover mean of 9.44%. The
most important effect on turnover is portfolio size, which increases turnover by almost
5%, followed by active weight of around 3%. The gender effect is evaluated binary, and
shows that the expected turnover of women is 3% lower than that compared to men. The
overall effect of risk and wealth on turnover is relatively small compared to the other
measured effects.
5.2 Who looses from trading?
So far, it is established that the trading return on average is decreasing in the active
weight, and that certain characteristics can be associated with more or less turnover.
When controlling for turnover in regressions on the characteristics, it is assumed that the
negative effect of turnover is the same for all investors. There is, however, considerable
variation in performance, and it is quite possible that turnover does not have the same
effect on investor performance conditionally on these variables. Therefore, the character-
istic variables are conditioned directly on turnover (TO) in the model
RTi = a0 + b0 · log(1 + TOi) +
∑
k
bk ·Xk,i +
∑
l
bl · log(1 + TOi) ·Xl,i + εi, (20)
where RTi denote the average individual trading return, data Xk,i = Xl,i denote the char-
acteristic variables excluding turnover, and regression coefficients bk and bl determines
the unconditional and conditional effects of turnover for the investor characteristics. The
reason for the (natural) log transformation of turnover is that it fits the data somewhat
better. The results are very similar in an untransformed specification. A positive bk, when
b0 and bl are excluded, measures the gross effect of the characteristics on performance.
This regression disregards that turnover itself vary between investor characteristics, as
documented in the previous section. When b0 is added, controlling for turnover, bk mea-
sures the average performance for investor types. When all coefficients are included in
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equation (20), bl is to be interpreted as the marginal impact of trading, conditional on in-
vestor type. The coefficients bk can therefore be thought of as intercepts, and bl as slopes
in the turnover and performance dimension. The point estimates in (20) coincides with
OLS, but the variance-covariance matrix is estimated with GMM, using asymptotically
robust errors as in White (1980). The results are presented in Table 4.
The regression coefficient for the active weight is significantly negative. The size of the
portfolio is a very important determinant for investor performance, since high turnover
in small portfolios are associated with higher transaction costs due to fees.15 When con-
trolling for portfolio size in the second column of Table 4, the point estimate for active
weight almost doubles. An increase of 10% in the active weight is associated with a 2.2
basis point drop in monthly trading performance. The negative effect drops, but sur-
vives when controlling for other investor characteristics. When turnover is excluded,
we neglect that turnover varies systematically over characteristics. The difference be-
tween the third and fourth column of Table 4 disentangle these effects. The coefficient
for active weight is much lower when controlling for turnover, because investors with
high active weights trade more, on average. Therefore, the main channel of underper-
formance is through increase trading, and not lower average trading ability. Similarly,
female investors trade less on average, so the positive effect of 10 basis point higher av-
erage performance is almost halved, but still significant at 6 basis points. The effect of
diversification is statistically significant, but the economic effect is very small. Investors
with one more stock in their portfolio have around 1 basis point less performance. The
inclusion of the risk measure ensures that the negative effect of the active weight is un-
related to the overall risky portfolio in relation to total wealth. Rather, higher overall
risk-taking is associated with positive trading performance, since a one standard devia-
tion increase in risk improves performance by about 4 basis points. The effect of investors
having financial occupation is positive, but insignificant. If wealth and age can proxy for
investor experience, these variables give contradicting results. The effect of higher wealth
is positive, but age is negative. Both effects are statistically and economically important.
15As shown by, e.g., Anderson (2004).
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A one standard deviation change in these variables represent 10 and 4 basis points in per-
formance. The economically most important effect comes from increased trading alone. A
one standard deviation positive shock to turnover above the mean (which corresponds to
a turnover level of around 27%) implies an additional 31 basis points in negative trading
performance per month–i.e. equally as much as the mean underperformance estimated
by the intercept.
The fifth column of Table 4 display the result of the full specification stated in equa-
tion (20). The coefficients for active weight is still insignificant, indicating that investors
who allocate a large share of their risky wealth to the online account are no better traders,
nor worse, than other investors. The magnitudes of the conditional effects are difficult to
interpret, so the results for Wealth, Portfolio size, Age, and Financial occupation are high-
lighted by plotting coefficients for different values of the independent variables in Figure
2A-D. In order to better understand the dispersion of the trading return, these graphs
also plot upper and lower quartiles for each of the five turnover quintiles and highest
decile, indicating the range for 50% of the observations (crossed, means are circled). All
regression coefficients can now be thought of as an “intercept” and a “slope” coefficient
in the trading return and turnover dimension. Figure 2A traces out the expected trading
return for high (dashed) and low (dotted) wealth investors at the 1st and 3rd quartile
of wealth in data. The effect of wealth is mainly better trading performance for higher
turnover, since the slope coefficient is high compared to the intercept term. The result in-
dicate that wealthier investors who trade more are better than corresponding low wealth
investors. In contrast, investors with higher portfolio size displayed in Figure 2B, seem to
have better trading performance in general, which is mainly due to them making larger
transactions at lower fees. This is evidenced by the last column in Table 4, where the
portfolio size coefficients drops considerably when fees are excluded from the regression.
Even if fees also affects the wealth coefficients, the conditional wealth effect is still about
half of that when including fees. Therefore, higher wealth is associated with an important
positive affect of trading performance that can not only be related to fees. The regression
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coefficients of age on performance suggest that young investors are both better traders
on average and that trading have less a negative impact on performance, as plotted in
Figure 2C. The marginal coefficient for financial occupation is large and strongly signifi-
cant, but the average effect was insignificant in the previous regression. Figure 2D plots
this relation, which implies that it is those with financial occupation who are very active,
who have better trading performance on average. This result can be indicative that some
of these investors have better information or overall higher ability to execute profitable
trades when they do trade. The large difference between financial and non-financial oc-
cupation is due to that there are only 326 investors in sample that have employment in
the financial sector.
5.3 How much is lost from trading?
The previous section found that investors with portfolios that constitute a large part of
financial wealth do not perform better than average. It directly follows that there are in-
vestors who loose substantial amounts in relation to their financial wealth. But it has not
yet been documented howmany these investors are, and howmuch they loose. The gross
trading performance is aggregated for gains and losses separately within the quintiles of
active weight and displayed in Table 5. Similarly, financial wealth, total net wealth, and
income are also aggregated and net losses expressed as fractions of these measures of
investor prosperity. The results from returns carry over to this table, since wealthier in-
vestors with lower stakes at the brokerage account both trade less and are better traders
on average when they do trade. The sixth row of Table 5 reveals that the investors who
are in the lowest quintile of active weight are over three times as wealthy compared to
the twenty percent in the top, and possess over ten times as much financial wealth. In
addition, the net trading loss is much larger for the fifth than the first quintile. There-
fore, the loss incurred by trading is carried by those who can afford them the least. In the
fifth quintile sorted on active weight, trading losses represents 3.70% of financial wealth
and 1.38% of yearly income. As a comparison, Swedish households with similar income
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spend 18.2% of their annual disposable income on recreational activities, on average.16
For example, general entertainment constitute 2.8%, sports and hobby 1.2%, and recre-
ational travelling 5%, of their total expenditures. Trading losses are therefore far from
negligible in this context.
The aggregated results do not display how trading gains and losses are distributed on
an individual basis. Figure 3A display the cumulative distribution of net gains normal-
ized by financial wealth and net wealth. The sharp curvature around 0 imply that the
trading revenue constitute a small share of wealth for the majority of investors–which is
a direct consequence of the distribution for the online portfolio shown in Figure 1. About
half, or 49% of the individuals have trading losses and gains representing 1% of their fi-
nancial wealth. Two thirds of the investors loose from trading, where 36% of them loose
more than 1% of financial wealth, and 17% more than 5%. The distribution is skewed,
so there are fewer who gains from trading. Still, about 8% of investors gain more than
5% from rebalancing their portfolio to their self-selected benchmark, measured as a share
of total financial wealth. The effect is similar, but less sharp when trading revenue is
normalized with total net wealth: 20% loose more than 1%, and around 9% more than
5%. Even if fees are an important determinant for returns, Figure 3B shows that these are
mainly associated with smaller trading losses. Without fees, 29% of investors loose more
than 1% of their financial wealth, compared to 36% when fees are included.
6 Conclusion
Many online investors trade too frequently and most of them loose compared to holding
their self-selected benchmark portfolio. This activity is difficult to rationalize with nor-
mative financial theory, and attempts have been made to explain this behavior. Most im-
portantly, investors may suffer from overconfidence and illusion of control, as suggested
by Barber and Odean (2002), and biased self-assessment as evidenced from Glaser and
Weber (2004) and Graham, Harvey, and Huang (2005). They may be sensation-seeking,
as proposed by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2005), or simply just untrained in financial de-
16Matched to the 7th income decile in the 2002 Household Budget Survey, Statistics Sweden.
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cision making such that they are unaware of the common traps of stock investment. All
the above explanations lean towards the conclusion that investors are uniformed or ir-
rational. A straightforward rational explanation for excessive trading is that investors
enjoy trading a small part of their portfolio for their entertainment, as suggested by Con-
lisk (1993), or they may find it rational to learn about financial markets with small bets
before entering with larger investments.
This paper documents that the most active individuals do not gamble with small
stakes. When the online portfolio constitutes a large share of risky assets, both the proba-
bility to trade increases, and turnover is also increasing in the share of risky assets held at
the online account. Furthermore, these investors do not perform better. There is in fact a
negative relationship between the share of financial wealth traded and the trading return,
measured from a self-selected benchmark. This relation disappears when controlling for
turnover, so the main channel of increased underperformance goes through increased
trading, and not lower trading ability. High portfolio value and wealth improves trading
performance, and wealthier people trade less. This means that the investors who are the
least equipped to carry losses, i.e. those with low wealth, are actually those who have the
poorest trading performance. In order to assess the importance of the costs across indi-
viduals, it is found that two thirds loose from trading, and over one third of the investors
loose more than 5% of their financial wealth on an annual basis.
The results do not exclude the possibility that individuals trade for their amusement.
If they do, however, the expected utility of gambling must be quite high for many in-
vestors. More over, there is little reason for allocating a large share of financial wealth
to this activity if it is trading itself that is rewarding, and there may be other games that
are less expensive to play in order to reach the same level of satisfaction. A simpler,
and very plausible alternative explanation forwarded here is that investors who believe
themselves to be better on average engage more heavily in trading. A slightly modified
Treynor-Black portfolio allocation model predicts that this relation can be independent
of the overall level of financial risk-taking and how much the individual under-weights
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the true riskiness of the stock market. The empirical evidence supports this proposition,
as the active weight is one of the strongest predictors of turnover. In particular, there is
a very weak link between overall financial risk-taking and trading frequency. The evi-
dence from the performance regressions suggest that biased self-assessment is mainly an
idiosyncratic phenomena. Investors who tilt their risky portfolio to stocks at their online
portfolio trade more, but are no better than other investors.
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Table 1: Mean statistics sorted on turnover
The 10,600 investors are sorted into quintiles (and tenth decile) based on turnover, defined as the sum of monthly purchases and sales
divided by two times portfolio value. Portfolio size is the value of the portfolio at the end of the first month of trading, which is also
when Age and the number of different stocks held, Diversification, is determined. All other variables are defined at first observed
year-end. The active weight is the online portfolio value divided total risky financial wealth. Income is disposable income net of
capital gains. Wealth includes financial wealth and the maximum of adjusted housing wealth net of liabilities. Risk is measured as
risky assets divided by wealth. Females and Finance measures the frequency of women and those who earned income from financial
occupation. All reported values are means, unless stated otherwise. Under the sample period, USD 1 corresponds to about SEK 9.
1       
(Low)
2 3 4 5        
(High)
Turnover, % 0.06 1.49 3.56 7.25 34.86 54.84 9.44 34.80    41.97***
Active weight, % 32.62 40.84 43.24 48.80 58.62 64.29 44.82 26.00    22.77***
Portfolio size, SEK 60,272 91,217 73,821 72,286 133,321 175,795 86,183 73,049      6.74***
Diversification, stocks 2.18 3.25 3.27 3.29 2.99 2.87 3.00 0.81     11.41***
Income, SEK (median) 336,397 321,395 316,357 307,919 296,025 301,491 315,249 -49,772     -3.60***
Wealth, SEK (median) 761,931 658,746 674,697 589,036 654,482 627,020 663,379 -50,165 -0.52
Risk, % (median) 23.14 26.93 25.66 24.71 29.13 30.02 25.97 3.39      3.02***
Females, % 23.35 20.42 20.05 14.43 11.89 11.13 18.03 -11.46      -9.82***
Age, yrs 39.21 37.97 38.15 37.55 38.36 39.27 38.25 -0.85     2.39**
Finance, % 3.40 2.12 3.16 3.02 3.68 3.40 3.08 0.28 -0.50
1) Difference in means between first and fifth quintile. 2) Test of difference in means (or proportions where applicable).
Asterisks ***, **, and * denote significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% percent level.
Test- 
statstic2
Turnover quinitles
Decile    
10 All
Diff.     
Q5-Q11
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Table 2: Trading returns and turnover costs
Investors are sorted into quintiles of active weight, which is the online portfolio value divided by total risky assets at first year-end.
The rows display the mean trading return, with and without fees, the turnover cost defined in the main text, average turnover, and
portfolio size.
1         
(Low)
2 3 4 5         
(High)
Active weight, %     1.96    11.36    35.00    75.93          99.87         44.82 97.91
Trading return, %     -0.23
***   
(-11.13)
    -0.23***   
(-11.61)
    -0.21***   
(-10.48)
    -0.25***   
(-11.16)
    -0.41***   
(-12.61)
    -0.26***   
(-25.20)
    -0.18***   
(-4.61)
Trading return 
(w/o fees), %
    -0.07***   
(-3.37)
    -0.07***   
(-3.76)
    -0.04***   
(-2.59)
    -0.07***   
(-3.58)
    -0.15***   
(-5.11)
    -0.08***   
(-8.48)
    -0.08**    
(-2.36)
Turnover          
cost, %
    -3.12***   
(-10.22)
    -2.80***   
(-10.35)
    -2.23***   
(-10.58)
    -1.51***   
(-9.54)
    -2.38***   
(-11.68)
    -2.41***   
(-22.83)
  0.74**    
(2.01)
Turnover, %     4.59
***    
(22.57)
    6.86***    
(20.34)
   8.17***     
(21.19)
   13.28***   
(23.85)
   14.33***   
(21.67)
    9.44***    
(45.37)
    9.74***    
(14.08)
Portfolio size, 
SEK
   32,165***  
(7.19)
   46,694***  
(13.53)
  91,909***  
(8.38)
 156,780***  
(15.83)
 103,368***  
(11.75)
   86,183***  
(23.42)
 71.203***   
(7.26)
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Difference  
Q5-Q1
Significance of a t-test (test statistics within parenthesis) are marked by ***, **, and *, indicating rejection
Quintiles by Active weight
AllVariable      means
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Table 3: Estimates of the determinants of turnover
The table display the parameters of a probit-estimation on the whole sample, and associated slope coefficients calculated at the func-
tional mean. The OLS regression is specified over the 9,053 investors with non-zero turnover, defined as the sum of monthly purchases
and sales divided by two times portfolio value. Portfolio size is the value of the portfolio at the end of the first month of trading, which
is also when Age and the number of stocks held, Diversification, is determined. All other variables are defined at first year-end. Active
weight is the online portfolio value divided by total risky financial assets. Income is disposable income without realized net capital
gains. Wealth includes financial wealth and the maximum of adjusted housing wealth net of liabilities. Risk is measured as the value
of risky assets divided by total wealth. Female and Finance are indicator variables for women or if income has been earned from
financial occupation. The marginal effects for the combined model is decomposed into the marginal effect on turnover and partici-
pation. The last column reports the effect on turnover of a one standard deviation shock to the independent variable. Intercepts are
suppressed.
 Model OLS         9,053 obs.
Dependent var: Trading (I/0) Slope1 Turnover Total Trading Participation
Active weight        0.210
***   
(3.80)
0.035        8.169
***   
(8.67)
7.776 7.402 0.374 2.978
Log  Portfolio 
Size
        0.212***  
(13.92)
0.036        3.216
***   
(11.68)
3.293 2.914 0.379 4.888
Diversification        0.255
***   
(19.02)
0.043       -1.145
***   
(-6.19)
-0.582 -1.037 0.455 -1.537
Log Wealth       -0.067
***   
(-4.60)
-0.011
 -0.236      
(-1.02)
-0.333 -0.214 -0.119 -0.615
Risk
     -0.105    
(-1.64)
-0.018     1.916
*       
(1.73)
1.549 1.737 -0.188 0.564
Female       -0.146
***   
(-3.57)
-0.024       -3.228
***   
(-6.67)
-3.185 -2.925 -0.260 -3.185
Log Age  -0.100
*         
(-1.68)
-0.017        5.747
***   
(6.29)
5.029 5.208 -0.179 1.538
Finance
-0.115       
(-1.26)
-0.019
1.986       
(0.96)
1.593 1.799 -0.206 1.593
 (Quasi)                 
R-squared 0.139 0.077
Probit                    
10,600 obs. Marginal effects
1
of one standard deviation shock to the independent variable, except for "Female" and "Finance" evaluated for binary values.
Turnover, one 
std. dev. 
shock to2
Reported t-statistics within parenthesis are based on Whites heteroscedastic standard errors. Asterisks *, **, and *** denote
significance on 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 1) Marginal effects evaluated at the regression mean. 2) Estimated effect to turnover
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Table 4: Estimates of the determinants of trading return
The table display the linear regression coefficients from various specifications with the trading return as the dependent variable.
Turnover is defined as the sum of monthly purchases and sales divided by two times portfolio value. Portfolio size is the value of
the portfolio at the end of the first month of trading, which is also when Age and the number of different stocks held, Diversification,
is determined. All other variables are defined at first year-end. The active weight is the online portfolio value divided by total
value risky financial assets. Income is disposable income net of capital gains. Wealth includes financial wealth and the maximum
of adjusted housing wealth minus liabilities. Risk is measured as risky financial wealth divided by wealth. Female and Finance are
indicator variables for women or if income has been earned from financial occupation. The first five columns regress the trading
return including fees directly on the independent variables, where the fifth column also condition them on turnover. The previous
analysis is repeated in the last column, but with turnover return excluding fees as the dependent variable. All independent variables
have been centralized.
Dependent variable Excl. fees
 Intercept        -0.310
***  
(-25.35)
       -0.310***  
(-25.57)
       -0.310***  
(-25.65)
       -0.310***  
(-26.11)
      -0.326***   
(-22.16)
      -0.0844**  
(-6.33)
 log (1+Turnover), 
LTO - - -
      -1.575***   
(-7.92)
     -1.965***    
(-8.21)
    -0.537**     
(-2.53)
 Active weight   -0.122
***      
(-3.40)
     -0.221***    
(-5.81)
     -0.118**     
(-2.60)
  -0.023      
(-0.54)
   -0.014     
(-0.32)
  -0.015      
(-0.38)
 LTO*Active w. - - - -  0.428       (0.86)
   -0.486      
(-1.13)
 Log Portfolio Size -       0.105
***    
(12.61)
      0.078***    
(7.04)
      0.113***    
(9.84)
         0.119***  
(11.34)
       0.030***   
(3.08)
 LTO* Log Portfolio 
Size - - -
       0.335***   
(2.99)
0.070        
(0.68)
 Diversification -  -0.001      (-0.21)
    -0.014**     
(-2.47)
        -0.017*** 
(-4.86)
  -0.006*        
(-1.82)
 LTO*Diversification - - - 0.012        (0.26)
   0.072*        
(1.79)
 Log Wealth -        0.065
***   
(4.43)
       0.065***   
(4.54)
      0.062***    
(4.56)
    0.025**      
(2.05)
 LTO*Log Wealth - - -       0.688
***    
(3.03)
    0.322*       
(1.79)
 Risk -      0.104
**      
(2.10)
     0.140***     
(2.75)
      0.131***    
(2.84)
  0.034       
(0.81)
 LTO*Risk - - -    1.262
*        
(1.90)
  0.434       
(0.86)
 Female -      0.100
***     
(3.54)
     0.063**      
(2.24)
    0.065*       
(1.84)
    0.061*       
(2.00)
 LTO*Female - - -  0.283       (0.50)
   0.787*        
(1.75)
 Log Age -       -0.181
***   
(-3.65)
      -0.117**    
(-2.37)
     -0.123**     
(-2.57)
      -0.104**    
(-2.40)
 LTO*Log Age - - -       -2.398
***   
(-3.44)
       -2.108***  
(-3.86)
 Finance - 0.002        (0.04)
0.019        
(0.26)
  -0.014      
(-0.22)
  0.016       
(0.26)
 LTO*Finance - - -       1.538
***    
(2.95)
     1.229**      
(2.55)
 R-squared 0.016 0.019 0.024 0.059 0.086 0.027
Trading return
 Reported t-statistics within parenthesis are based on Whites heteroscedastic standard errors. Asterisks ***, **,
and * denote significance on 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 5: Aggregate trading losses
Then 10,600 investors in sample are sorted into quintiles and top decile of activeweight, which is the observed portfolio value observed
at first year-end divided by total financial wealth. The net trading payoff for each investor is aggregated into total losses and gains for
each of the two groups. The four bottom rows display and normalizes net gains with total financial wealth, total wealth, and income
net of capital gains for each investor group. Values are in thousands of Swedish crowns (tSEK), where USD 1 roughly corresponds to
SEK 9.
1          
(Low)
2 3 4 5         
(High)
Total losses, 
tSEK -4,773 -6,495 -8,740 -25,258 -17,446 -62,712
Total gains, 
tSEK 3,260 4,574 7,395 15,950 8,047 39,226
Net gains,        
tSEK -1,513 -1,921 -1,345 -9,308 -9,399 -23,486
Financial wealth, 
tSEK 2,721,510 715,594 529,765 542,274 254,310 4,763,453
Net gains / fin. 
wealth, % -0.06 -0.27 -0.25 -1.72 -3.70 -0.49
Wealth,          
tSEK 5,503,150 2,403,157 2,162,958 2,056,789 1,537,862 13,663,916
Net gains / 
wealth, % -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 -0.45 -0.61 -0.17
Income,          
tSEK 921,176 768,121 763,074 713,012 678,759 3,844,142
Net gains / 
income, % -0.16 -0.25 -0.18 -1.31 -1.38 -0.61
All
Aggregate 
trading revenue 
and wealth
Quintiles by Active weight
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Figure 1: The online portfolio weight
The cumulative frequency distribution of the online portfolio weight is plotted for the 10,600 investors in sample. The online portfolio
is defined as portfolio value at first, observable year-end, divided by either total market value of risky assets or total financial wealth.
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Figure 2: Regression slopes conditional on turnover
Figures 2A-D shows regression slopes from numerical experiments when manipulating the independent variables. Figures 2A shows
the effect of investors with wealth at upper and lower quartiles in sample. Figures 2B and 2C repeat the analysis for Portfolio size and
Age. Figure 2D shows the expected trading performance for investors with and without Financial occupation. Circles trace out the
mean for the trading return quintiles and top decile, where crosses shows the first and third return quartile for each group.
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Figure 3: Cumulative frequency distributions of net gains as a share of wealth
Figure 3A depicts the cumulative frequency distribution for the net annualized gains of 10,600 investors in sample, measured as a
share of financial wealth as well as total wealth. Figure 3B display net annualized gains divided by financial wealth with and without
fees.
Figure 3A Figure 3B
0.00%
25.00%
50.00%
75.00%
100.00%
-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
Percent net gain
C
u m
u l
a t
i v
e  
f r
a c
t i o
n  
o f
 i n
d i
v i
d u
a l
s
Share of financial wealth
Share of wealth
0.00%
25.00%
50.00%
75.00%
100.00%
-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
Percent net gain
C
u m
u l
a t
i v
e  
f r
a c
t i o
n  
o f
 i n
d i
v i
d u
a l
s
Share of financial wealth
Share of wealth (without fees)
35
